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without first addressing how emotion itself is being 
designed as labour within the current new spirit  
of capitalism. In this sense the increasing emphasis on 
emotion in design reflects and reinforces what is 
currently at the core of late capitalism, that is, the  
shift to affect, knowledge, information and  
experience, what Italian Marxist theorists (Maurizio 
Lazzarato, Christian Marazzi, Antonio Negri,  
Paolo Virno) define as immaterial labour. Against  
this backdrop I refer to Eva Illouz’s notion of 
emotional capitalism and Bernard Stiegler’s ideas of 
psychopower and the capture of attention, as well as to 
Deleuze’s ideas on modulation and control. My 
intention in this paper is first to map the territory of 
what we mean by affect, as distinct from emotion 
(Deleuze, Massumi). The notion of an affective turn in 
the social sciences will be addressed (Patricia  
Clough). Then I will look at the transmission of affect 
(Teresa Brennan) by invoking an epidemiology 
paradigm (Gabriel Tarde) and ideas of social contagion 
and viral spreading. Finally I will position these  
ideas in relation to designed objects and the  
process and practice of design, specifically in relation 
to what is known as emotion- driven design.
The constitution of a psychopolitics reaffirming itself as a noopolitics through 
the technologies of the spirit is the major stake in a reorganisation of capitalism 
(Stiegler 2008)
Marketing is now the instrument of social control (Deleuze 1995)
People love to entrain (Thrift 2008)
Introduction
My intention here is to problematize the relationship between design and emo-
tion by suggesting a framework based instead on the idea of affect. I argue that 
any discussion on design should be firmly placed within the wider framework 
of the current transformations of late capitalism and its concern with modes of 
control of, and engagement in, the affective sphere. This means reconsidering 
the production of value as inherent to life itself and its potential for experi-
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I am investigating the notion of affect as elaborated by 
Baruch Spinoza and, drawing from Spinoza,  
also by Gilles Deleuze and Brian Massumi, who have 
written extensively about this subject in relation  
to the constitution of subjectivities. The general 
framework I am following is given by the critique of 
current forms of capitalism, which I am inclined  
to rename semio-chemio-neuro-affective capital. This 
term underlines the coagulation of different  
levels of production, reproduction and control 
concerning regimes of signs, circulation of knowledge 
and affects, language and desire, the chemical  
and neurological composition of subjectivities and so 
on. I see here a progression from my previous work  
on how the production of subjectivities within  
a biopolitical / affective framework is mediated by 
psychopharmaceutical technologies (Marenko 2009a) 
and on the emotional entanglement that characterizes 
our relationship with objects, which I have  
reframed within a neo-animist paradigm (Marenko 
2009b). I argue that we cannot look at design  
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ence, entertainment, emotion and enjoyment. A key point is that value is now 
extracted from, and created by, the interception, modulation and mining of 
pre-individual affective capacities. 
My reflection on the field of design and emotion aims at both unpacking its 
ideological underpinning and locating it firmly within the above described 
broader affective realm. I would like to start from the premise that all design 
has to do with intensities and affects circulating among the stakeholders: ob-
jects, designers, users, as well as contexts. This position is predicated upon the 
central tenet that designed objects are always meaning-making machines and 
the emotions elicited cannot but be intrinsically and utterly relational.
Critique of the current view 
of design and emotion
The current literature on the relationship between design and emotion, a re-
search field formalized in 1999 with the First International Conference on 
Design and Emotion (Delft University of Technology) and the foundation of 
the Design and Emotion Society in the same year, is rooted in a cognitive and 
functionalist approach and seems driven by the intention to define, catego-
rize (Jordan 2000), and quantify (Desmet 2004) emotions. This has genera-
ted some interesting outcomes, but also some equally interesting and eloquent 
criticism (Demir 2008, Kurtgozu 2003, Savas 2008, Yagou 2006). The main 
 critique is that the prevailing framework is reductionist as it focuses on a nar-
row understanding of emotions, products and users, as if emotions were some-
thing extra that can be designed into a product as an added value, disregarding 
the fact that emotions are always context-based and, as said above, utterly 
relational. Furthermore, within the field of design and emotion there seems to 
be a general agreement on the fact that, far from being understood and dis-
tinguished from other states, emotions are elusive, intangible and difficult to 
define (Desmet 2004, Desmet et al. 2008, McDonagh et al. 2004).
Donald Norman (2004) is one of the few who distinguishes between affect 
and emotion. While affect is what gives us the capacity to discern and make 
judgements for our survival (and includes emotions), emotion is «the conscious 
experience of affect, complete with attribution of its cause and identification 
of its object» (Norman 2004, 11). Elsewhere (Desmet and Hekkert 2007) the 
terms ‹affect› and ‹experience› are used interchangeably, underlying the fact 
that any product experience is inherently affective.1 This seems to be a conten-
tious issue, as all design can be said to be ultimately about eliciting emotional 
response. In this light, even the modernist narrative, often represented as pred-
icated upon lack of emotion, is revealed as a machine-based fiction eschewing 
its complex affective engagement with the user (Yagou 2006). Another point 
has to do with the narrow, even trivial, concerns of the design and emotion 
field, which seems myopically and stubbornly engaged with measurement and 
taxonomy (Yagou 2006). Indeed, even though Pieter Desmet acknowledges 
that «the emotional aspects of a design can be difficult to discuss because they 
are often based on intuition» (Desmet 2004, 121); that «little is known about 
how people respond emotionally to products and what aspects of design or 
1 Desmet and Hekkert use the model of Core affect theory to map the multifaceted range 
of experience emerging from user-product interaction, which includes subjective feelings, 
behavioural reactions, expressive and physiological reactions.
interaction trigger emotional responses» (Desmet 2004, 111); and that it is 
«surprisingly difficult to come with a solid definition» for emotion (Desmet 
2004, 112), he has elaborated a well-known method of measurement.2
Finally, the design and emotion field postulates a hierarchy of consumer needs 
(inspired by Maslow’s hierarchy of needs). Jordan (2000), for instance, argues 
that following the satisfaction obtained at a functional level, «people will soon 
want something more: products that offer something extra; products that are 
not merely tools, but living objects that people can relate to; products that bring 
not only functional benefits but also emotional ones» (Jordan 2000, 6). This 
point reinforces the assumption that, as products become increasing ly  similar 
in technical terms and performance, the only way to distinguish them in a 
crowded market is by eliciting emotional and experiential responses (Desmet 
2004, Norman 2004). However, as Savas (2008) has shown, this is ground ed 
on a disassociation between emotions and fulfilment of needs which does not 
take into account the complex variability of material and social conditions 
of existence, surely affecting the emotional engagement with, and responses 
to, the world of designed objects. This divorce between emotions and func-
tions risks to thin out the design and emotions debate and turn it into another 
market-driven catchphrase for the elite consumption of luxury commodities.
To sum up, the notion that emotional value can be added to a product to 
increase its appeal is unconvincing, as it does not account for the affective 
sphere within which emotions are produced and circulate. Moreover, it fails 
to consider the extent to which affects enter into the composition of subjec-
tivities which are continuously negotiated in relation to the encounters with 
human and non-human agencies (objects, bodies, people, events, things). In 
other words, emotions cannot be located in objects. Rather, they emerge out of 
the very relationality among stakeholders and the variable contexts involved. 
This is also the position of sociologist Sara Ahmed (2004) for whom emotions 
are first and foremost relations (hence belonging to neither the subject nor the 
object), which, literally, shape our bodies by leaving the traces of their passage 
imprinted onto our corporeal surface.3
The same can be said of experience. If experience is an always emerging, ne-
gotiable, contingent, situated relation, this implies that «we cannot design an 
experience. But with a sensitive and skilled way of understanding our users, 
we can design for experience» (Wright et al. 2004, 52).
I would argue that probing into notions of affects could offer significant bene-
fits to any investigation on design. In what follows, I address the philosophical 
roots of affect and outline a discussion of the circulation of affects in contem-
porary capitalism.
The affective turn
In his introduction to ‹The Affective Turn› (Clough 2007) Michael Hardt con-
siders the current interest in affect found in critical theory. Tellingly, the title of 
2 PrEmo (Product Emotion Measurement), a non verbal self-report instrument based on cartoon 
faces that measures 14 emotions often elicited by product design (Desmet 2004, 114).
3 Ahmed’s work on the relation between emotion, body sensation and cognition draws from 
Descartes, Hume and James. The idea that emotions are tied up mainly to bodily sensation 
is also argued by neuroscientist Antonio Damasio. He says: «emotions play out in the 
theater of the body, feelings play out on the theater of the mind» (Damasio 2003, 28). 
Hence, while emotions are actions or movements, feelings are always hidden.
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his essay asks precisely what affects are good for, and in so doing offers indica-
tions as to the possible links between this (renewed) interest in the affect-scape 
and various other, including, I argue, design, which would benefit from being 
reconceptualised through the framework of this paradigm. What is certain is 
that the relevance of affects in contemporary media, art and critical theory is 
growing (Clough 2007, Massumi 1996 and 2002).
One of the most radical aspects of the centrality of affects concerns the syn-
thesis it requires. Affects engage body and mind, reason and passions. They 
have to do with «both our power to affect the world around us and our power 
to be affected by it» (Hardt, 2007 ix). Spinoza is the philosopher whose voice 
inspires and reverberates in the current concern with affects. It is to Spinoza 
that we should turn to investigate affect and, more generally, the relationship 
among bodies, objects and power. His claim that there exists a parallelism 
between body and mind, reason and passion, problematizes the way in which 
their relationship is thought of. In other words, it must be acknowledged and 
taken into account the correspondence between mind’s power to think and 
body’s power to act. Affects straddle the continuum of their relationship, indi-
cating the current state of mind and body.
The scholar of passions, which he investigates with a rigorous geometrical 
method, as if they were lines, surfaces and bodies,4 Spinoza never actually 
mentions emotions or feelings using instead the word affect (from the Latin 
affectus) to describe passions. He makes an important distinction between 
affections and affects. While affections are states of the body (effects of a body 
upon another body), affects are variations of the power of the body (effects of 
affections upon a duration).5 So affects are first and foremost «the trace of one 
body upon another» (Deleuze 1988, 138), exactly as a body casts its shadow 
on another, and we can infer them both because of this shadow. But affects 
are also the ensuing variations in power from one state to another. This means 
that power and affectivity are strictly linked. Power is indeed «what opens 
up the capacity for being affected to the greatest number of things» (Deleuze 
1988, 71). Finally, affective states are vectors each corresponding to a specific 
kind of knowledge and mode of existence. 
For Spinoza, it is all a matter of encounters: an encounter is good when my 
relations are compounded and my powers increase (e.g. food); an encounter is 
bad when my relations are dissolved and my powers decrease (e.g. poison).6 
Any encounter is therefore always the encounter between different horizons of 
affectivity, that is, different states of transition in the power of bodies. Follow-
ing Latour’s notion of non-human agency (Latour 2005), we must intend these 
encounters as occurring among human and object. 
It is precisely this philosophical framework that allows us to reconceptualise 
the relationship we entertain with the material world as affect-based. If on one 
4 See Ethics, III, 83.
5 For Spinoza, affects are «the modifications of the body by which the power of action of 
the body is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time the ideas 
of these modifications» (EIIIDef3: 83). 
6 Good and bad are «the two senses of variation of the power of acting: the decrease in 
power (sadness) is bad; its increase (joy) is good» (Deleuze 1988, 71).
hand this can help us to disentangle and clarify the often confused definitions 
of affect and emotion, of which more later, on the other it also intends to locate 
the production and circulation of affects together with the production of the 
‹immaterial› (codes, information, ideas, cognitive and creative labour) and to 
ground it within the broader perspective of postfordist forms of life. Thus, a 
reflection on the role of affect in the material world of designed objects con-
cerns the epistemological shift from an economy of production and consump-
tion to an economy based on the circulation of affects or intensities within the 
domain of biopolitical control. Indeed, any discussion of design, empathy and 
emotion should be placed within an affective theory of late capitalism (semio-
chemio-neuro-affective capital), an «almost fragile mode of social organiza-
tion, the perpetuation of which depends on the existence of hospitable life 
forms (e.g. bodies, subjectivities, social relations, material processes, desires, 
and fantasies)» (Vrasti 2008). Philosopher Brian Massumi warns:
The ability of affect to produce an economic effect more swiftly and surely than 
economics itself means that affect is a real condition, an intrinsic variable of 
the late capitalist system, as infrastructural as a factory. Actually, it is beyond 
infrastructural, it is everywhere, in effect. Its ability to come secondhand, to 
switch domains and produce effects across them all, gives it a metafactorial 
ubiquity. It is beyond infrastructural. It is transversal. This fact about affect 
–its matter-of-factness needs to be taken into account in cultural and political 
theory. Don’t forget. (Massumi 2002, 45).7
The difference between affect and emotion
As Massumi (2002) has remarked, we lack a consistently specific cultural 
and theoretical vocabulary to describe affect, too often used – wrongly – as 
a synonym for emotion.8 While emotion is a subjective, qualified, recognis-
able intensity, «the socio-linguistic fixing» (Massumi 2002, 28) of a personal 
experience, affect is instead unqualified, pure intensity, neither ownable nor 
recognizable or measurable. Affect is the unactualized capacity to affect and 
be affected.9 Affect is a prenarrative, preindividual intensity, akin to chaos 
theory’s critical point when «a physical system paradoxically embodies mul-
tiple and normally mutually exclusive potentials, only one of which is ‹select-
ed› » (Massumi 2002, 32).
To say that affect is a preindividual intensity means to shift from a subject-cen-
7 It must be remembered that the non-rational has always been part and parcel of capital. 
Thrift (2008) mentions Keynes’ infamous ‹animal spirits› – «contagious spirits like 
confidence, fear, ‹irrational› exuberance, bad faith, corruption (…) and the very stories 
we tell ourselves about our economic fortunes», as «powerful psychosocial forces», which, 
however, have been ignored albeit with a few exceptions (Keynes, Pigou, Mill, Bagehot).
8 Chapman (2009) addresses the issue of emotional durability as a possible, if yet 
untested, solution to the issues of in-build obsolescence and a Kleenex-culture of 
disposability. His argument of a lack of a specific language of emotional durability both 
in academic and industry circles echoes Massumi’s point of a lack of a specific grammar 
for affect.
9 Manuel DeLanda (2002) makes explicit the connection between this notion of capacity and 
Gibson’s notion of affordance, indicating a potential capacity of an object, different 
from intrinsic properties and actualized only in relation to specific context. For 
instance, a piece of ground whose capacity of affording support to walking creatures is 
not another intrinsic properties, rather one that emerges only in relation to the presence 
of said creature. Furthermore, affordances are exquisitely symmetrical insofar as they 
express both capacities of affecting and being affected.
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tred theory to an affect-based one, where the subject as we knew it is no longer 
a founding entity, but what counts are ceaselessly coagulating and dissolving 
waves of affective states around which the negotiable fictions of the ‹I› gather 
and are verbalised. As the point of emergence, assemblage and coexistence of 
different levels,10 affect is first and foremost immanence, that is, it is manifest 
in the material world. Therefore, it has to be experienced, and experimented 
upon. Deleuze remarks upon this point when he says: «No one knows ahead 
of time the affects one is capable of; it is a long affair of experimentation» 
(Deleuze 1988, 125). 
This virtual, unactualized aspect of affect is significant insofar as it helps to 
clarify the distinction between emotion and affect. While affect is autonomous 
and openness to the possible, emotion is the most contracted expression of 
affective capture. Else said, affectivity is a force that possesses a material and 
energetic dimension (i.e. affects increase or decrease the power of the body, 
they enhance it or deplete it), it is a flow of intensity that mediates the relation-
ship between the pre-individual and the individuated (Virno 2001, 78).11
I now turn to investigate the general framework provided by theories of post-
fordism and late capitalism. Here, too, the prevalence of an affect-based regis-
ter is found in the work of several theorists (Clough 2007, Hardt 1999, Illouz 
2007, Lazzarato 2006, Massumi 2002, Stiegler 2010, Thrift 2006, 2008, 
Vrasti 2008). 
Sociologist Eva Illouz’s notion of ‹emotional capitalism› describes «a culture 
in which emotional and economic discourses and practises mutually shape 
each other, thus producing (…) a broad, sweeping movement in which affect 
is made an essential aspect of economic behaviour and in which emotional life 
– especially that of the middle classes – follows the logic of economic relations 
and exchange» (Illouz 2007, 5). For Illouz the process of managing and giving 
names to emotions (against their volatile nature) has engendered an ‹emotional 
ontology›, that is: 
The idea that emotions can be detached from the subject for control and 
clarification. Such emotional ontology has made intimate relationships 
commensurate, that is, susceptible to depersonalization, or likely to be 
emptied of their particularity and to be evaluated according to abstract 
criteria. This in turn suggests that relationships have been transformed into 
cognitive objects that can be compared with each other and are susceptible to 
cost-benefit analysis (Illouz 2007, 36). 
Terminally disjointed from the social, material, cultural and human context 
responsible for their emergence, emotions become quantifiable, countable, and 
discrete – objects that can be traded and exchanged. 
10 Although these levels may be described in terms of body and mind, depth and surface, 
action and reaction, they should not, however, be intended as binary oppositions, but as 
«resonating levels» (Massumi 2002, 33).
11 See Simondon (2001).
Capture, domestication and saturation of affect
Here it might be relevant to refer to philosopher Bernard Stiegler’s work, which 
focuses on a critical analysis of mediatic capitalism as directly affecting the 
spiritual life of the individual, namely the life of the brain itself, via an affective 
saturation and destruction of attention, taken as particular instances of the 
destruction of libidinal energy. Stiegler (2008) defines ‹capture of attention› as a 
globalised phenomenon of «synchronised and hyper-realist collective hallucina-
tion» that produces a syndrome of cognitive and affective saturation.12 This sys-
tematic capture of attention is one with cultural capitalism and is made possible 
by a plethora of psychotechnologies. What is interesting in Stiegler’s perspective 
is not only that the framework is no longer a biopower controlling producers, 
but by a psychopower controlling consumers. Rather, it is the set of modalities 
through which this process takes place to be significant for our reflection on de-
sign. Among the psychotechnologies enlisted by cultural capitalism toward the 
creation of spaces of affective capture we find self-help literature and the advice 
industry (Illouz 2007), soft-power geopolitics, pharmaceutical industries and 
psychopharmaceuticals,13 storytelling-based marketing, experience economy, 
preferences listing and, crucially, emotion-driven design.
As Nigel Thrift (2006) remarks in his lucid analysis on new forms of consump-
tion: «For some time now, there have been attempts to extend the signature 
of the commodity, both by enlarging its footprint in time and by reinforcing 
its content, most especially by loading it with more affective features» (Thrift 
2006, 286). Certainly commodities are being stretched, dilated, swelled. 
However, as I am trying to argue throughout, this process does not involve 
«loading commodities with affective features» as much as turning them into 
triggers for an increasingly unmitigated affective experience. This dilation of 
the experiential factor, or unlimited offer of pre-packaged intensities, must be 
read, however, as the ultimate dispositive of abolition of the experience tout 
court (Consigliere 2010).14
Among capitalistic modes of harnessing cognitive and non-cognitive (af-
fective) competencies, Thrift (2006 and 2008) discusses sensory branding, 
buy-ology and neuromarketing techniques aiming at unlocking buyers’ secret 
needs and desires by working either on measuring their brain activity and 
its correlation with the propensity to buy; or else, by implementing a socio-
cultural re-engineering of consumers’ mind involving the whole of their sen-
sorial / affective  realms.15 We are now well beyond sensorial branding. We are 
12 On the relation between new economy and attention deficit see also Marazzi (2008).
13 On the triangulation among visual discourse of psychopharmaceuticals, design and the 
production of subjectivities see Marenko 2009.
14 Stefania Consigliere’s essay draws from Isabelle Stengers and Philippe Pignarre 
(2005) La sorcellerie capitaliste. Pratiques de desenvoutement, Le Decouverte, Paris. 
For Stengers capitalism in itself is a system of sorcery, whose modes of capture (against 
which we have no protection) include, I argue, emotion-driven design.
15 With the term ‹neuromarketing› we intend a new field of research at the crossroad of 
psychology, science and marketing, which employs brain scanning techniques such as fMRI 
(functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) that by detecting the amount of oxygenated blood 
in the brain can visualize areas as little as one millimetre where brain activity flares 
up. Neuromarketing is «only one small aspect of the larger neuroeconomy that includes the 
psychopharmaceutical industry, the neurological products themselves (…) the financial 
services, the marketing companies, the consumers and, lastly, its own financial index» 
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now in the empire of worlding, i.e. the creation of meaningful worlds engende-
red by a strategic modulation of flows and waves of affects. 
I argue that emotion-driven design should be located within this framework 
in order to understand its implications and the (ideological) rationale under-
pinning its endeavour. Emotion-driven design, like psychopharmaceuticals 
or neuromarketing, belongs to an ongoing restructuring of the relationship 
between subjectivities and capitalism, mediated by patterns of consumption, 
experience, lifestyles, moods, in short, by affect. Emotion- driven design has 
to do less with design and more with the social and cultural monitoring of 
affectivity. Emotion- driven design has to do, ultimately, with new, pervasive, 
strategies of biocontrol. 
We must be careful, however, not to confuse social critique with paranoia.
The target of control is not the production of subjects whose behaviours ex-
press internalized social norms; rather, control aims at never-ending modu-
lation of moods, capacities, affects, and potentialities, assembled in genetic 
codes, identification numbers, ratings profiles, and preference listings, that is 
to say, in bodies of data and information (including the human body as infor-
mation and data) (Clough 2007, 19).
In his famous and prescient Postscript on Control Societies (1995) Deleuze 
wrote that control operates on, and equates with, modulation of moods, access 
codes, passwords.16 The object of modulation is life and living being, and it 
is through the control of modulation that biopower is exercised. Philosopher 
Maurizio Lazzarato (2006) draws on Deleuze when he writes:
The capture, control and regulation of the action at a distance of one mind on 
another takes place through the modulation of flows of desires and beliefs and 
through the forces (memory and attention) that makes these flows circulate in 
the cooperation between brains. In modulation, as a modality of the exercise 
of power, it is always a question of bodies, but now it is rather the incorporeal 
dimension of bodies which is at stake. The societies of control invest spiritual, 
rather than bodily, memory (contrary to the disciplinary societies) (Lazzarato 
2006, 185).
These dispositives of control and the new relations of power that operate by 
capturing memory and attention take the name of noo-politics (Stiegler 2008). 
«If disciplines moulded bodies by constituting habits mainly in bodily memo-
ry, the societies of control modulate brains and constitute habits mainly in 
spiritual memory» (Lazzarato 2006,186). In other words, we can say that af-
fects, language, knowledge and life itself are taken as productive, engendered 
and exploited.
(Abi-Rached 2008, 1160). See Senior, C. and Lee, N. (eds.) (2008) Journal of Consumer 
Behaviour. Special Issue: Neuromarketing, Volume 7 Issue 4-5, July – October.
16 Deleuze defines modulation as such: «controls are a modulation, like a self-
transmuting molding, continually changing from one moment to the next, or like a sieve 
whose mesh varies from one point to another» (Deleuze 1995, 179). Tellingly, we encounter 
discussion about moods also in texts about branding of places and third places. See 
Klingmann 2007 where alongside performance, appeal and impression, differentiation and 
seduction are listed as the criteria that make up a strong personality in architecture.
Focusing on how to define the singularity of relations of control, Lazzarato’s 
analysis of the transition from disciplinary societies to societies of control 
invokes Gabriel Tarde to find an answer. Tarde, whose work is undergoing 
a slow but consistent rediscovery in the field of humanities and social sci-
ences (see Deleuze and more recently Latour), was one of the most influential 
19th century French sociologists. Fierce opponent of Emile Durkheim, Tarde 
re futes Durkheim’s notion that society is always greater than the sum of its 
parts, an idea he considers a mystical abstraction. On the contrary, Tarde 
maintains that the whole is always inferior to the parts. Moreover, and essen-
tial for an understanding of the role of affects in late capitalism, Tarde had the 
radical intuition that economy as such rests on a core of beliefs and desires, 
what he calls ‹passionate interests›. Finally, his understanding of society as 
epidemio logical, i.e. based on the idea that affects spread like epidemics, is of 
the utmost relevance to this paper. 
However, my concern lies not much on the critique of postfordism outlined 
above, as on the extent to which we can use it to analyse our relationship with 
the designed object. To do this, let us examine the way affects spread, how 
they circulate among bodies and what traces they leave of their passage. And 
what affects do.
On contagiontology
Again, it is to Tarde’s micro-sociology of contagious repetition and imitation 
that we refer. He says:
… it is nevertheless true that … belief and desire bear a unique character that 
is well adapted to distinguish them from simple sensation. This character 
consists in the fact that the contagion of mutual examples re-enforces beliefs 
and desires that are alike, among all those individuals who experience them at 
the same time … we no longer have epidemics of penitence … but we do have 
epidemics of luxury, of gambling, of stock-speculation, of gigantic railroad 
undertakings, as well as epidemics of Hegelianism, Darwinism, etc. (Tarde 
1903 in Lazzarato 2006).17
Thrift (2008) draws on Tarde to discuss the socio-biological nature of pro-
cesses of contagion and imitation according to which affects circulate within 
an ecosystem. He argues for a biology-based account of economies and hu-
man societies, or at least one where biology and culture might be considered 
in equal measure. Perception, cognition and action are not separate realms. 
The world of experience has neurophysiological foundations. Experience (and 
even history itself) can be reframed as swashes of hormones «which constantly 
operate on what are remarkably plastic brain synapses through the medium of 
cultural amplifiers like caffeine, sentimental novels, pornographic works, and 
all manner of consumer goods» (Thrift 2008, 88).
If material culture is but an extension of human cognition (and not its reflec-
tion), this means that its evolution is actively shaping human intelligence. Take 
17 The end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century witnessed a great interest 
in crowd behaviour and psychology: the idea of a group mind affecting (often irrationally) 
a crowd was taken for granted (e.g. Gustave Le Bon’s notion of social contagion in The 
Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, 1896)
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for instance the media, argues Thrift, and their increasing power in propa-
gating psychosocial forces, such as identification of populations / audiences, 
data mining, new forms of demographics (everyday metrics like hits, social 
networking sites and so on). They are creating new sources of reflexivity where 
audiences’ responses are interpreted as a combination of technology, imitation 
and the «swash and swirl of affect» (Thrift 2008, 84). 
A different viewpoint is argued by the late Teresa Brennan (2004), whose the-
ory of transmission of affects states «the opposite of the sociobiological claim 
that the biological determines the social. What is at stake is rather the means 
by which social interaction shapes biology» (Brennan 2004, 74). For Brennan, 
the circulation of affects alters anatomical makeup – an anti-neo-Darwinist 
idea if ever there was one. Not only is the transmission of affect socio-psycho-
logical in its origins, it is also responsible for bodily changes, as it modifies the 
biochemistry and neurology of the individual.
Brennan points out how «in a time when the popularity of genetic explanations 
for social behaviour is increasing, the transmission of affect is a conceptual od-
dity. If transmission takes place and has effects on behaviour, it is not genes that 
determine social life; it is the socially induced affect that changes our biology» 
(Brennan 2004, 1).18 In other words, the transmission of affect is a process «so-
cial in origin but biological and physical in effect» (Brennan 2004, 3). 
Thus, intensities spread by contagion: a viral infection that travels through 
assemblages, a series of psychogenic epidemics (e.g., chronic fatigue syndro-
me, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, depression) that engulfs cor-
porealities via images and mimesis, smells and auditory factors. It remains 
unclear, however how this process actually takes place. For Brennan, even 
the definition of psycho-epidemics does not tell us «how a social and psycho-
logical affect buries itself within or rests on the skin of an utterly corporeal 
body» (Brennan 2004, 3).
I wonder whether we could use these ideas on the transmission and dissemi-
nation of affect to suggest an epidemiological map of how the spreading of in-
tensities is co-opted and monitored by a semio-chemio-neuro-affective capital 
and, more to the point, why should design pay attention. What Karl Palmas 
(2009) with fortunate expression calls ‹Tardian contagiontology› ought to be 
understood in the context of a daily life increasingly mined, monitored and 
recorded by psycho-technological devices. Our probable future is rendered, 
made visible and foreseen by new modes of surveillance (social monitoring, 
predictions of behaviours, mapping of patterns of consumption and so on). 
However, to define these apparata as surveillance is perhaps reductive. Rath-
er, these technologies are forms of entrainment whereby one person’s affects 
are linked to another by chemical, olfactory, rhythmic and hormonal means. 
Entrainment is the process by which «one person or group’s nervous and hor-
monal system are brought into alignment with another’s» (Brennan 2004, 9).19 
Hence, the creation of ad-hoc publics. Again, we find Tarde uncannily presci-
ent on this regard.
18 Brennan argues that this idea encounters resistance, as the individual is still 
assumed as being emotionally independent, affectively self-contained and owning his / her 
own emotions.
19 One instance is chemical entrainment which works mainly by smell – unconscious 
olfaction (i.e. pheromones, molecules that communicate chemical information concerning 
aggression or sex).
Publics
At the end of the 19th century, when the societies of control begin to elabo-
rate techniques and dispositives, Tarde explains that the ‹social group of the 
future› is neither the crowd, the class, nor the population, but the ‹public› (or 
rather publics). By the public, Tarde understands the public of the media, the 
public of a newspaper: «The public is a dispersed crowd in which the influence 
of minds [esprits] on one another has become an action at a distance» (Tarde 
1989:17 in Lazzarato 2006, 179). 
If it is important to reflect on this notion of ‹publics› expressing the new sub-
jectivities that characterize control societies as among the public, invention 
and innovation spread almost instantaneously «like the propagation of a wave 
in a perfectly elastic milieu» (Tarde 1989, 38), in a broader sense this has to do 
with the range of affective competencies increasingly demanded and mobilized 
by the semio-chemio-neuro-affective capital so to «ensure the spontaneous 
and enthusiastic participation of individuals» (Vrasti 2008). Thus, we can talk 
about a capillary micro-distribution of governance that affects intimate lives, 
desires, modes of conduct, social relations, lifestyles aspirations, feelings – in 
short, the spectrum of our affective sphere. The personal is governed. Affective 
literacy has become a prerequisite for an economically proficient participation 
in neoliberal economies. To use Thrift’s eloquent expression: «affect brings 
together a mix of hormonal flux, body language, shared rhythms and other 
form of entrainment to produce an encounter between the body (understood 
in a broad sense) and the particular event» (Thrift 2008, 236).
In this sense, consumption itself is nothing but a «series of affective fields» 
(Thrift 2006, 286). Waves of affects surge and circulate where intuition and 
habits are distributed over small slices of time, presiding over the encounter 
with the commodity, clearly influencing consumption patterns by affectively 
binding consumers. To tap into this affective milieu the industry that investi-
gates consumers’ wants and needs is even more forcefully employing neuro-
aesthetics (the study of the neural basis of artistic creativity and experience) 
as well as neuromarketing. The aim is to produce a «rapid perceptual style 
which can move easily between interchangeable opportunities, thus adding 
to the sum total of intellect that can be drawn on» (Thrift 2006, 286). The 
point is to swiftly mobilize new structures of thought, to rewrite experiences 
as commodities, to immerse the relationship between consumer and object in 
the amniotic fluid of a market-driven emotional prosthetics. 
One example of this is the active and vocal involvement of consumers via 
any user-generated social media platform, where the capture of enthusiasm 
is co-opted and deployed in what could be described as an ongoing beta test 
(for instance, Amazon preference listings). Another example is the continuous 
expansion of the resonance of commodities, whose stickiness stretches out 
through sensory design (smells, noise, aromas, texture) and through «extend-
ed architectures of onflow, designed as a process in order to capture process» 
(Thrift 2006, 295).
What is the connection between the types of social relations and subjectivities 
emerging from, and required by, this specific formation of capitalism and the 
realm of design? Can it be argued that (some of) these competencies are shaped 
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by, and surface from, the encounter with designed objects? How can our en-
counter with the commodity be reconfigured to account for such contagious 
affectivity? Finally, what are the emotional pressure points that trigger waves 
of affect to act like glue between consumer and object via consumption?
Many questions, with no claim to provide answers. Only some indications 
of where those answers might be found: for instance in the shifting bound-
aries between ‹prosumption› and ‹hacking›, where the encounter with the 
com modity is reconfigured not only by making consumption and production 
closer, but also by a power transfer into the competences and inventiveness of 
users.20
Conclusion
This paper started with a twofold ambition. First, it aimed at engaging critical-
ly with the landscape mapped out in so much of the current design and emo-
tion literature arguing instead for the necessity of an affective turn. Second, it 
attempted to do so by reframing the issue of emotion- driven design within the 
broader framework of late capitalism. 
If it is true that design is always concerned with future behaviours, with in-
scribing into matter a realm of possibilities, with offering a potential map of 
the immediate future and its events, it will also be true that any theoretical 
resource that can capture, even partially, these realms, should be a welcome 
addition to the tool-box of the thinking designer, especially if it can offer ways 
to analyse, explain and predict patterns of consumption, and the swerves of 
affect emerging in the encounters with objects. Ideas concerning the formation 
of public and audiences, the rendering of future forms of interaction, and the 
way in which affects spread should certainly be of interest. 
When we address not only the way human experience itself is being rewritten, 
but also what counts as experience; when we look at ways in which affectively 
controllable environments are engineered; when, finally, we understand the 
spreading of influence and affect via forms of mimetic desire, imitation, in 
short, via viral models of contagion, we have on our hands theoretical tools to 
map what, with fitting expressions, Thrift describes as the ‹geography of what 
happens› and ‹speculative topography›. Theory is nothing but a diagnostic 
tool, a way of asking questions – both a ‹quest and a questioning›, rather than 
a way of suggesting answers. And design, if we want, can be at the forefront 
of this process.
20 See Alvin Toffler’s influential 1980 book The Third Wave and Scott Burnham’s well 
known pamphlet (2009).
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